Africa hopes Trump will be put in check after the midterm polls

US President Donald Trump dances after speaking at a midterm campaign rally at the Ocean Center in Daytona Beach, Florida on October 30, 2026. [AFP]

That the Democratic Party would perform well in the US midterm elections was never in doubt. But the “blue tsunami” or, as some have called it, the “DEI wave”, where the Democrats, a significant number of electees being women and persons of colour, have resoundingly taken both Houses of Congress, came as a shocker.

In African capitals there is a mixture of relief and cautious expectation. The hope is not that Washington will suddenly unveil a bold new Africa strategy, but that the worst instincts of the Trump administration’s “America First” approach will now face a meaningful check. The reality, analysts warn, is likely to be a shift in temperature far more than a transformation in policy. The most immediate practical consequence lies in trade.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was extended only through the end of 2026. A Democrat-controlled Congress now has a decisive role in whether the programme is renewed, and on what terms. For countries like South Africa and Rwanda, which Trump threatened to remove from AGOA from January 2027, there may be some reprieve as Democrats could use their new power to question the exclusion, though reversing an executive order would not be automatic.

For Kenya’s textile and apparel sector, AGOA’s renewal remains existential, and a Congress controlled by Democrats is seen as more likely to defend the trade preferences than a Republican one focused on domestic economic priorities. Foreign assistance is the second arena where the midterms matter. The Trump administration has already dismantled the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and sharply reduced development funding, moves that have hit health programmes across Africa, including PEPFAR’s HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention work. Democrats are expected to use hearings and investigations to revisit those cuts and to fight for continued funding through the State Department.

Yet the optimism should be tempered. Even if Congress passes legislation to restore some aid, President Trump retains veto power, and he has signalled his intention to use the veto, and overriding it would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers; a high bar in a polarised Washington.

In any event, popular opinion in Washington indicates that there is little political appetite for rebuilding USAID; everybody has moved on from traditional development assistance. The more realistic outcome is aggressive oversight and public embarrassment of the administration, not a return to the aid levels of the past.

Immigration and visa policy represent a third area of potential friction and opportunity. The Trump administration has imposed visa restrictions affecting more than half of sub-Saharan African countries, a point African diplomats have raised with frustration.

Democratic lawmakers could push back against some of the harsher measures, but immigration law gives the executive branch considerable discretion, and congressional leverage is limited. What Democrats can do is amplify the contradiction between Washington’s rhetoric about “commercial diplomacy” and its restrictions on African business travellers, forcing the administration to defend policies that undermine its own economic agenda.

Beyond specific policy files, the midterms alter the political geometry of Washington. A record seven first and second generation African lawmakers, all Democrats, will serve in the next Congress. Senator Chris Coons, a longstanding advocate for Africa, is to become the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These voices may not dictate policy, but they will make it harder for Africa to be ignored entirely. At the same time, divided government means gridlock is the most likely default. Democrats can investigate, embarrass, and block, but they cannot legislate a new Africa policy without presidential acquiescence.

For African governments, the lesson is to judge Washington by what it does, not by what Democrats say about what Trump has done. The midterms have changed the political temperatures in Washington but not the fundamental tenor of US–Africa relations. A Congress that checks the president is better than one that rubber-stamps him, but it is not a substitute for a coherent American strategy toward the continent.

The change in Washington is certainly not a reason for African capitals to pause their own efforts to diversify trade partners, mobilise domestic resources, and reduce dependence on any single external power. That, and not the promise of friendly Western government policy, is the ultimate solution for the continent’s challenges

-The writer is an advocate of the High Court