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Kanja orders police headcount as officers join Russian army

Crime and Justice
By Zadock Angira and Hudson Gumbihi | Nov 21, 2026

Police headquarters has ordered a mandatory physical headcount of all police officers following reports that some members of the service were being illegally recruited by foreign agencies to work as mercenaries.

Investigations have revealed that some officers who had either deserted or been discharged from the National Police Service (NPS) had sought employment in foreign forces, with Murang’a and Kiambu counties the most affected.

The headcount directive, though denied by Vigilance House, comes amid a preliminary report by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) indicating that both the NPS and the Kenya Prisons Service (KPS) were losing billions of shillings to payroll fraud. The fraud involves paying officers who had left the service and were employed elsewhere.

As a result, Inspector General of Police Douglas Kanja last week directed all commanders to conduct an immediate headcount and verification of all officers posted under their command.

“The Inspector General has noted that members of the service are being illegally recruited by foreign agencies to join military service. The IG is taking remedial measures to verify the current strength and has ordered an urgent mandatory physical reconciliation exercise of all personnel within your respective jurisdictions,” read a letter seen by The Standard.

For officers who are not physically present during the verification exercise and cannot be accounted for, commanders are expected to compile a detailed report for submission to Jogoo House.

The details required include service number, payroll number, full name, county, station and remarks. Specific reasons for the officer’s whereabouts must be given, for example, authorised leave, sickness, absence without official leave (AWOL), conviction or suspension from duty, along with the exact date from which the officer was noted absent or away from duty.

Three weeks ago, while asking police headquarters to set the record straight on Police Constable Peter Maina Gakuu, who joined the Russian military, The Standard sought to establish whether his was an isolated case.

Gakuu, 34, who served at several police stations including Samburu, Baringo and Embu, was on leave when he was reportedly recruited in Nairobi by Russian agencies towards the end of last year.

According to information provided by his family, he travelled to Russia, joined the Russian army and was deployed to the war front in Ukraine. The family last spoke to him on January 28, 2026, and relatives now fear he may have been killed in the battlefield.

In a letter, The Standard asked the NPS for the information it held on Gakuu; whether it knew if he was alive or dead; the number of police officers who may have been recruited by Russian agents; whether the service had any intelligence indicating that he intended to travel to Russia; and whether it was in touch with his family.

Responding to some of the queries, Police Spokesperson Muchiri Nyaga said Gakuu was being treated as a deserter and that the service had no information about his involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Nyaga declined to comment on the number of officers who might have been lured to join the foreign war.

Even as Vigilance House downplayed the headcount, with some senior officers maintaining that Kanja had not issued such a directive, the DCI probe has established that police and prisons officers who had quit are still on the payroll.

In the prisons service, for instance, the probe found a near-total concentration of suspicious earnings in one allowance category, transfer allowance. This suggests a shared method or shared knowledge of a specific weakness rather than parallel, independently discovered fraud.

The investigations were launched after Commissioner General of Prisons Patrick Arandu reported on June 18, 2026 payments that could not be supported by documentation, and a pattern of suspicious transactions being stopped during pre-payroll audits over an extended period.

The probe was to establish whether irregular payments were made; who was responsible for initiating, processing and approving them; and the veracity and extent of the payments.

A total of 10,483 officers received individual arrears amounting to Sh1,482,026,102 through 38,078 transactions. Of this, Sh777.16 million across 7,925 transactions involving 3,088 officers was flagged as suspicious. Basic salary dominated the suspicious arrears profile at Sh359.8 million across 2,554 transactions and 2,015 officers.

A total of 12,622 prisons officers received individual earnings totalling Sh1.244 billion through 131,121 transactions. A separate analysis identified 4,001 suspicious individual-earnings transactions worth Sh183.15 million as paid, while Sh222.063 million across 4,722 transactions was subsequently stopped.

Transfer allowance accounts for Sh176.33 million of the Sh183.15 million in suspicious paid earnings, or 96.3 per cent of the total.

The scheme converged on transfer allowance, which detectives believe is because it is easier to justify superficially, easy to process without triggering rank or entitlement cross-checks, or tied to a specific exploitable field or workflow step in the Human Resource Information System (HRIS-Ke).

Though the investigations are still ongoing, the suspicious-and-paid figure stands at Sh960,316,290, of which Sh777.16 million is arrears and Sh183.15 million is earnings.

A physical file examination of 1,670 sampled payments found that only 334 (20 per cent) were supported by the requisite documentation and approval.

“This 80 per cent failure rate in a random sample is the single most glaring data point in the investigations,” states the DCI report.

The investigations revealed that supported, properly approved transactions took at least three minutes between submission and approval, while a substantial number of suspicious transactions were approved in about 30 seconds and as little as five seconds.

According to the detectives, a five-second approval is not humanly consistent with retrieving a physical file, examining supporting documents, verifying the claimed entitlement against pay-group rules, and then approving in HRIS-Ke.

“This timing gap is quantifiable, system-generated and difficult to fabricate after the fact, making it strong circumstantial evidence that the checker step was bypassed, automated or rubber-stamped,” adds the report.

It was also noted that suspicious transactions were spread across multiple authorised users rather than concentrated in one account. On its own, this could suggest either widespread independent misconduct or a smaller number of people using multiple accounts or credentials.

The IP-address analysis further revealed that some access originated from locations inconsistent with officers’ known duty stations. The same IP address recurred across different accounts, an indicator of either a shared physical terminal used improperly or credential-sharing. Single accounts were also associated with multiple IP addresses within one day, which is unusual for a single legitimate user unless working across locations.

However, since HRIS-Ke has no multifactor authentication or one-time password (OTP) and no device identifiers were available, the system cannot currently distinguish between a legitimate user acting alone, a legitimate user whose credentials were stolen and multiple people knowingly sharing one login.

In both the police and prisons cases, the modus operandi involved a beneficiary officer being introduced to the arrangement by a colleague or, in some cases, an HR officer. Irregular arrears or earnings transactions were created and pushed through HRIS-Ke at abnormal speed, payment was released through the normal payroll run, and a share of the resulting additional net pay was passed back to the recruiter or facilitator.

The scheme was coordinated, as common recruiters were named across multiple apparently unconnected beneficiaries, and there are shared workstations and shared or clustered payment dates among recipients. Also noted was a consistent, quantified proceeds-sharing ratio (half or two-thirds) reported independently by different prisons officers who were questioned.

The investigations also revealed at least six system control weaknesses that enabled the fraud. They include the absence of multifactor authentication or OTP on user accounts, evidenced by repeated shared IP addresses; ineffective enforcement of the maker-checker control; weak documentary verification before approval; no device or MAC-level identification; no exception-based or real-time alerting; and limited monitoring of payroll amendment volume and patterns.

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